史諾登事件十週年,我們仍在找尋隱私與安全之平衡點

議程

14:00-14:05  活動介紹
14:05-15:45  焦點座談

  • 主持人-熊誦梅 合夥律師(德勤商務法律事務所)
  • 與談人-
    • 李欣穎 執行長 (開放文化基金會)
    • 林昕璇 助理教授(國立成功大學政治學系)
    • 紀博文 副教授(臺灣師範大學資訊工程學系 )
    • 黃禎慶 股長(內政部警政署 刑事警察局科技研發科 )
      (依姓名筆劃順序排列)

15:45-16:00  現場問答

會議記錄

台灣網路講堂於9月20日(三)舉辦「史諾登事件十週年,我們仍在找尋隱私與安全之平衡點」座談會,由德勤商務法律事務所熊誦梅合夥律師主持,邀請開放文化基金會李欣穎執行長、國立成功大學政治學系林昕璇助理教授、臺灣師範大學資訊工程學系 紀博文副教授以及警政署刑事警察局黃禎慶股長,共同探討如何在法制、市場、網路集中化等各種壓力下,仍維持隱私與安全之間的平衡。

李欣穎 執行長 (開放文化基金會)

李欣穎執行長開宗明義指出,國家安全與人民隱私之間確實存在拉扯,兩者無法偏廢,即便如此,政府仍不能以國家安全為由侵害隱私權利。111年憲判字第13號【健保資料庫案】中,許宗力大法官引述日本漫畫《無街之城》內容,強調無隱私社會所面臨的全面監控情狀,政府不應以公共利益為由,導致社會淪為無隱私保護之地。

李執行長提到,全球數位平臺中,串流媒體與大型社群媒體平臺擁有許多用戶資料與隱私,亞洲和臺灣平臺亦然。根據臺灣人權促進會調查,政府向數位平臺調取資料時缺乏透明度,政府只有向電信公司調資料時符合通保法規範,而法務部目前仍以「有礙犯罪」、「妨礙偵查效能」等理由,拒絕公開大部分與企業約定調取條件之內容。

國際指標方面,「國際企業數位人權排名計畫」(Ranking Digital Rights,RDR )根據開放資料,定期評估全球主要數位平臺和電信公司的人權表現,範圍涵蓋公司治理、隱私、言論與資訊自由等三大面向。RDR於台灣進行之評估主要聚焦於數位隱私,基本而言,在臺灣受估評的本土和亞洲業者皆依法提供隱私政策,但政策內容對使用者的保障程度有待提升,包括使用者資訊保存;回應政府要求索取使用者個資之機制;政府要求使用者資訊之相關資料;以及告知使用者其資訊遭索取等面向,評分皆低。

李執行長總結,隱私具備透明、開放與不可妥協三大特性,透明性讓使用者和平臺彼此信任;開放則帶來彈性,使用者擁有決定平臺掌握何種資料之權利,儘管國家安全重要,但隱私也同樣是公民權利,絕對有保障之必要。最後,隱私保護也影響數位經濟,舉例而言,由於Meta、X等大型科技平臺不夠尊重用戶隱私,許多用戶紛紛選擇棄用這些平臺。

林昕璇 助理教授(國立成功大學政治學系)

林昕璇教授首先重整史諾登事件脈絡,2013年,美國國安局約聘僱職員Edward Snowden向英國《衛報》和美國《華盛頓郵報》等媒體揭露,美國國安局長期系統性、大規模攫取美國與外國公民情資,甚至出於國安需求監控外國政要。此案在當時引發軒然大波,Snowden此後成為俄國永久居民,得到俄國庇護,至今Snowden仍遭英美通緝。

史諾登事件爆發後,媒體開始揭露,美國國安局如何透過大規模網路監控情資。美國國安局為監控計畫中心,而由於其隸屬於五眼聯盟,因此方便與英國、加拿大、澳洲與紐西蘭情報機構合作;國安局亦以國家機構身分要求Facebook、Amazon和Apple等大型科技公司提交人民個資。

美國《涉外情報監控法》(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,FISA)明確定義電子監控,並授權國安機構和情報單位在具備授權基礎下,開展大規模監控。一般情況下,政府開展監控須取得法院令狀,但根據FISA第702條款,美國政府針對境外非美國公民開展監控,則無需取得令狀。

監控標準作業流程(SOP)方面,美國國安局首先運用初步視覺化分析,透過搜尋通聯記錄系統性描摹出大型通話網路,從而發現特定關聯,並仰賴情報人員的直覺性判斷與經驗找出具高度嫌疑之通話,以利調閱並進行進階分析,找出關鍵節點。國安監控審查流程方面,美國情報機關會將達到監控門檻之通訊紀錄交付司法部審查,經審查後,情報法院即核發監控許可令狀。

史諾登事件發生後,國際特赦組織等民權團體針對美國監控架構提出訴訟,主張美國國安局監控計畫已侵害公民隱私,但遭最高法院駁回,後續相關訴訟仍此起彼落,幾乎皆未勝訴。法官經常性見解是,原告基於其推測之「高度懷疑遭監控」之恐懼,不足以構成明確實質權利侵害;且人民同意將資料交付電信業者或商業組織等第三方,即喪失隱私合理期待,此為「適用第三人理論」。

林教授接著比較傳統監控與大型監控情境之不同,傳統監控執行單位為聯邦法院,通常針對特定犯罪嫌疑人進行監控;大型監控執行單位為國安局,其出於國家安全反恐目的,針對所有註冊電話號碼之電信用戶開展監控。兩者資訊來源和授權依據皆有歧異。

林教授總結,如欲規管大規模監控,考量要點包括法源依據、規範標的、規範對象、資料後續使用之嚴格監管、民主課責與監督機制、公私協力模式等面向。

紀博文 副教授(臺灣師範大學資訊工程學系 )

紀博文副教授首先介紹Edward Snowden和美國國安局看待監控之不同觀點。Snowden認為,美國政府對於資料索取的正當性確實經過法律訴訟,不過都是秘密進行且政府從未敗訴;而過去33年中,美國政府曾申請3萬4千筆搜索票,其中僅11筆遭駁回。Snowden指出,人民應藉由網路影響力和公開性監督政府,而不是被政府監控。時任美國國安局副局長Ledgett反駁,國安局透過監控措施攔截大量可疑事件,從而保護國家和人民安全,且相關監控行為確受監管。

紀教授隨後引述日本小說《銀河英雄傳說》觀點,表明人們對於隱私和國家安全的看法並非固定,而是因情境和經歷的不同持續變幻。舉例而言,人們認為美國對於恐攻相當敏感、甚至歇斯底里,但恐攻是美國的真實經歷,因此美國政府對國家安全的高度重視自然不足為奇。

隱私與國安的兩難,其實不存在放諸四海的平衡點,相關制度與法律反映出背後價值,且可能變化。紀教授表示,應重視技術使用者選擇自由,當使用者重視隱私,可能會因此喪失服務使用權利,這有賴使用者自行取捨。此外,使用者選擇應受尊重,因隱私考量而選擇不使用數位技術者不應遭遇歧視;且應提升使用者資訊科技能力,使其能保護自己。與此同時,應強化使用者網路使用韌性,畢竟當人們更加重視隱私,往往代表政府介入程度降低,這時人們很可能會彼此傷害(如網路言論霸凌 ),有鑑於此,提升使用者網路韌性相當重要。

紀教授表示,當Google提供網路服務時,必須蒐集、查看甚至修改使用者資料,這是業者提供網路服務的一般情況,然而,使用者時常想在享受網路服務的同時保護隱私。為滿足使用者期待,密碼學界開發出「全同態加密技術」,即所有「服務」皆在加密狀態下提供。儘管此技術看似是兩全其美的解決方案,惟其尚未成熟,尚無法實際應用於現實生活。

黃禎慶 股長(內政部警政署 刑事警察局科技研發科 )

黃股長自犯罪防治角度析論,科技演進帶來犯罪型態轉變,例如詐欺犯罪現已演化成App、網路賭博與投資詐欺等新型態詐騙,並透過跨境營運加上網路犯罪等模式做案。詐騙集團防不勝防的特性使執法機關疲於奔命,其IP時常設在國外,因此衍生出跨境司法管轄權議題,柬埔寨詐騙案更彰顯出詐騙國際化之趨勢。

罪犯能濫用虛擬貨幣進行洗錢、迅速轉移贓款,而此類貨幣具備去中心化特性,導致贓款流向更加難以追查。個資外洩方面,詐騙集團能透過各類管道取得民眾個資,並以此發送釣魚簡訊,甚至透過偽基地台等手法開展網路釣魚。黃股長表示,個資外洩是相當嚴重的議題,除歐美情報單位外,駭客集團可能蒐集更多個資並售於暗網。

黃股長指出,史諾登事件發生後,民眾隱私意識抬頭,Apple甚至拒絕與FBI合作解鎖槍殺美國軍人的沙烏地阿拉伯軍官iPhone手機密碼;我國《科技偵查法》草案的GPS和空拍偵蒐規範相對寬鬆,亦引發監控隱私爭議。黃股長則認為,《科技偵查法》蒐證流程條文規範過於清晰,反而導致偵蒐意圖太過明顯。

簡報下載
  • 李欣穎 執行長 (開放文化基金會)-簡報下載
  • 林昕璇 助理教授(國立成功大學政治學系)-簡報下載
  • 紀博文 副教授(臺灣師範大學資訊工程學系 )-簡報下載
  • 黃禎慶 股長(內政部警政署 刑事警察局科技研發科 )- 簡報下載

Ten Years After Snowden Revelations — We Are Still Looking for Privacy and Security Balance

Agenda

14:00-14:05  Introduce
14:05-15:45  Panel Discussion

  • Moderator
    – Sung-Mei Hsiung, Attorney, Deloitte Legal
  • Panelists:
    -Singing Li, CEO, Open Culture Foundation
    -Hsin-Hsuan Lin, Assistant Professor, The Department of Political Science of National Cheng Kung University
    -Po-Wen Chi,  Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan Normal University
    -Chen-Ching Huang, Sub-Division Chief, Technology Crime Prevention Center, Criminal Investigation Bureau

15:45-16:00  Q&A

Meeting Minutes
Singing Li, CEO of the Open Culture Foundation

Ms. Singing Li first stated that there is indeed a tension between national security and individual privacy, and neither can be neglected. Nonetheless, the government cannot infringe upon privacy rights under the pretext of national security.

Ms. Li further emphasized that global digital platforms, including streaming media and large social media platforms, possess a significant amount of user data and private information.  According to a survey conducted by the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, there is a lack of transparency when the government requests data from digital platforms. The government only complies with the regulations of the Communication Security and Surveillance Act when requesting data from telecommunications operators. The Ministry of Justice currently refuse to disclose the data they retrieved from the platforms, citing reasons such as “obstructing criminal investigations” and “hindering investigative efficiency.”

On the international front, the “Ranking Digital Rights” (RDR) project assesses the human rights performance of major global digital platforms and telecommunications companies based on open data. The evaluation covers three main aspects: corporate governance, privacy, and freedom of speech and information. In Taiwan, the assessment conducted by RDR primarily focuses on digital privacy.  In general, the assessed companies in Taiwan provide privacy policies in compliance with the law. However, there is still room for improvement in terms of user protection, including aspects such as how user information is stored, mechanisms for responding to government requests for user data, providing relevant information to the government when requested, and informing users when their information is being accessed. Scores in these areas are relatively low.

Ms. Li concluded that there are three essential characteristics in privacy: transparency, openness, and non-compromise. Transparency fosters trust between users and platforms, while openness provides flexibility, allowing users to decide what data the platform can access. Although national security is crucial, privacy is also a fundamental civil right that must be protected. Ultimately, privacy protection also impacts the digital economy. For example, due to the lack of respect for user privacy by large tech platforms like Meta and X (formerly known as Twitter), many users have chosen to abandon these platforms.

Hsin-Hsuan Lin, Assistant Professor, 
The Department of Political Science of National Cheng Kung University

Professor Hsin-Hsuan Lin started by briefing the Edward Snowden case. In 2013, a former employee of the United States National Security Agency (NSA), disclosed to media outlets that the NSA had been systematically and massively collecting intelligence on both American and foreign citizens for national security purposes. This revelation caused a significant uproar at the time. Subsequently, Snowden became a permanent resident in Russia and received asylum there. To this day, he remains wanted by British and American authorities.

After the Snowden incident, media outlets began to expose how the United States National Security Agency (NSA) engaged in large-scale internet surveillance for collecting intelligence. The NSA served as the hub for surveillance programs and, because it is part of the Five Eyes alliance, it facilitated cooperation with intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The NSA, operating as a national agency, also required large tech companies like Facebook, Amazon, and Apple to provide people’s personal data.

The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) explicitly defines electronic surveillance and authorizes national security agencies and intelligence units to conduct large-scale surveillance under certain authorized circumstances. In general, government surveillance typically requires obtaining a court order. However, under Section 702 of FISA, the U.S. government can conduct surveillance on non-U.S. citizens located overseas without the need for a court order.

In terms of the national security surveillance review process, U.S. intelligence agencies submit communication records that meet the surveillance threshold for review by the Department of Justice. After the review, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issues surveillance warrants if warranted.

After the Snowden reveal, human rights advocate organizations like Amnesty International and others filed lawsuits against the U.S. surveillance framework, arguing that the NSA’s surveillance programs had violated citizens’ privacy. However, these lawsuits were rejected by the Supreme Court, and subsequent related cases have seen similar outcomes with very few successful results. Judges often held that the plaintiffs’ fear of being “highly suspected of being monitored” based on their speculation was insufficient to establish a clear and substantive infringement of their rights. Additionally, the argument was made that when people voluntarily share their data with third parties like telecommunications companies or businesses, they lose a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is known as the “third-party doctrine.”

Professor Lin summarized that to regulate large-scale surveillance, key considerations include legal basis, scope of regulation, targets of regulation, strict oversight of data’s subsequent use, democratic accountability and oversight mechanisms, and public-private cooperation models, among other aspects.

Po-Wen Chi, Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science and 
Information Engineering, National Taiwan Normal University

Professor Po-Wen Chi began by introducing the different perspectives of Edward Snowden and the U.S. NSA regarding surveillance. Snowden believed that the U.S. government’s data collection efforts, while technically legal due to secret court proceedings, had never been challenged in court. He argued that people should use their online influence and transparency to oversee the government rather than being monitored by it.  In contrast, NSA countered by stating that the agent has intercepted a significant number of suspicious events through surveillance measures, thereby safeguarding national and individual security. He also emphasized that the relevant surveillance activities were subject to oversight and regulation.

Professor Chi then quoted the perspective from the Japanese novel “Legend of the Galactic Heroes” to emphasize that people’s views on privacy and national security are not fixed but continuously change due to different contexts and experiences. For example, people may perceive the United States as being highly sensitive or even hysterical about the threat of terrorism. Still, terrorism is a real experience in the United States, so it’s not surprising that the U.S. government places a high emphasis on national security.

The dilemma between privacy and national security does not have a one-size-fits-all balance point; the related systems and laws reflect underlying values and can change over time. Professor Chi suggested that we should emphasize the freedom of choice for technology users. When users prioritize privacy, they may forfeit their rights to certain services, and this choice should be respected. Furthermore, users’ choices should not lead to discrimination, as those who choose not to use digital technology for privacy reasons should not face discrimination.

It’s also important to enhance users’ digital literacy so that they can protect themselves. At the same time, strengthening users’ online resilience is crucial. When people place a higher value on privacy, it often means reduced government intervention, but it may also lead to harm among individuals, such as online bullying or harassment. Therefore, improving users’ online resilience is essential in this context.

Professor Chi pointed out that when Google provides online services, they need to collect, view, and sometimes modify user data, which is a common practice for service providers. However, users often want to protect their privacy while enjoying online services. To meet these expectations, the field of cryptography has developed “homomorphic encryption technology,” where all “services” are provided in an encrypted state. Although this technology appears to be a win-win solution, it is not yet mature and cannot be practically applied in real-life situations.

Chen-Ching Huang, Sub-Division Chief, Technology Crime Prevention Center, 
Criminal Investigation Bureau

From a crime prevention perspective, Mr. Chen-Ching Huang analyzed how technological advancements have led to changes in the patterns of criminal activities. For example, fraud crimes have evolved into new forms like app-based scams, online gambling, and investment fraud. These new types of fraud often involve cross-border operations and cybercrime methods, making it challenging for law enforcement agencies to combat them effectively. The characteristic of fraud groups being difficult to prevent, with their IP addresses frequently located overseas, has raised jurisdictional issues. The Cambodian fraud case highlighted the increasing internationalization of fraud activities.

Criminals can exploit cryptocurrencies for money laundering and rapid transfer of illicit funds, and the decentralized nature of these currencies makes it more difficult to trace the flow of funds. In the case of personal data breaches, fraud groups can obtain individuals’ personal information through various channels and use it for sending phishing messages. They may also employ tactics like setting up rogue cell towers for network phishing. Mr. Huang emphasized that personal data breaches are a significant issue, and in addition to Western intelligence agencies, hacker groups may gather even more personal data and sell it on the dark web.

Mr. Huang noted that after the Snowden incident, public awareness of privacy increased, and companies like Apple even refused to cooperate with the FBI in unlocking the iPhone of a Saudi Arabian military officer involved in a shooting of American soldiers. In Taiwan, the draft Technology Investigation Act, which contains relatively lenient regulations regarding GPS and aerial surveillance, has sparked privacy controversies. Mr. Huang believes that the specific provisions of the evidence collection process in the Technology Investigation Act may be overly clear, making investigative intentions too obvious.

The European Union’s strong emphasis on privacy has had an impact on cybercrime prevention. Before 2018, law enforcement authorities could use WHOIS domain lookup services for investigations, simply by entering a website’s URL to access relevant registration information. This information was crucial in tracking down fraudulent websites. However, after the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect, the public WHOIS data, which included personal information such as the names, phone and fax numbers, email addresses, and personal addresses of registrants and technical administrators, was considered non-compliant with GDPR.

Presentation Download <Provided with the consent of the speaker>
  • Singing Li, CEO, Open Culture Foundation –Presentation Download
  • Hsin-Hsuan Lin, Assistant Professor, The Department of Political Science of National Cheng Kung University-Presentation Download
  • Po-Wen Chi,  Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan Normal University-Presentation Download
  • Chen-Ching Huang, Sub-Division Chief, Technology Crime Prevention Center, Criminal Investigation Bureau- Presentation Download